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Disentangling the social and economic dimensions of agricultural behaviour: what role 
for institutions and social capital? 
 
Philip Kostov and John Lingard1
 
Agricultural production is increasingly combined with other economic and non-
economic activities. This leads to complex interactions taking place within rural systems. The 
recent policy shift towards a more holistic approach in terms of integrated and sustainable 
models of rural development emphasises these developments. In this context the role of ‘non-
economic’ determinants of behaviour is placed to the fore. The orthodox economic approach 
stresses (almost) instantaneous adjustments to prices and other ‘economic’ factors. This is at 
odds with idealised images of the ‘efficient’ market, which is characterised by a great deal of 
uncertainty. In such a volatile environment, routines-based behaviour, such as following 
institutional rules and/or socially acceptable types of behaviour, usually described in term of 
‘social capital’, is advantageous and creates a more stable environment. The stable 
environment is a pre-requisite for workability of the purely ‘economic’ arrangements. This 
intuitive argument is developed using a simple mathematical model, incorporating ‘social’ 
and ‘economic’ factors. The social dimension enhances the impact of economic factors, 
slowing the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium state. Some conditions under which the 
social and institutional infrastructure are beneficial or detrimental for economic development 
are outlined. An important by-product of our model is the conclusion that social and economic 
factors are closely entangled and their separate influences are purely analytical devices. 
Ignoring this entanglement may lead to serious biases in quantitative analysis. Some examples 
of these potential pitfalls are presented. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Agricultural production is increasingly combined with other economic and non-
economic activities which leads to complex interactions taking place within rural systems. 
The recent policy shift towards a more holistic approach of integrated and sustainable models 
of rural development emphasises these developments. In this context the role of ‘non-
economic’ determinants of behaviour is placed to the fore. The orthodox economic approach 
stresses (almost) instantaneous adjustments to prices and other ‘economic’ factors. This is at 
odds with the idealised image of the ‘efficient’ market, which is characterised by a great deal 
of uncertainty. Uncertainty has long been viewed as a dominant characteristic of agriculture in 
developing countries. The strong protectionism of agriculture in developed industrialised 
nations has to some extent insulated it against uncertaintly and the inherent instability of 
agricultural markets involving biological production processes and nature-based supply 
systems.  
 
In such a volatile environment, routines-based behaviour, such as following 
institutional rules and/or socially acceptable types of behaviour, usually described in term of 
‘social capital’, is advantageous and can create a more stable environment. Protectionalist 
policies have a similar emphasis. A stable environment is a pre-requisite for workability of the 
purely ‘economic’ arrangements since it fosters socially desirable traits such as trust, 
reciprocity, and social responsiveness, which enhance social interaction and render the market 
system workable (Polaniy, 1944, Schumpeter, 1944). Therefore analytically detaching 
economic factors from the underlying social context may be detrimental to understanding the 
underlying interactions with the socio-economic systems of agricultural production. Much of 
the economic literature on the role of social factors in the dynamics of economic process is 
descriptive. It is now recognised that the social factors (institutions, social capital) have 
important impacts on economic performance. They are however either taken for granted (i.e. 
treated as external constraints) or hypothesized to be the outcome of some ‘efficiency’ 
process. In this paper we treat both the social and economic factors as intrinsically 
endogenous. 
 
 
2. MODEL FORMULATION 
 
 
To investigate the joint effects of social and economic factors we use the following 
simple stylised model: 
 
Let us assume there are n individuals (or farms). The main term of interest is the 
output variable y (it may be utility). The latter is hypothesised to depend on two variables: an 
‘economic’ one, which we denote by e and the ‘social’ variable s.  
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We use a superscript on the function in the notation above with a view to making the 
further notation more readable. Note that the economic variable is the same across individuals, 
whilst the social one varies. 
 
The distinction we draw between the ‘economic’ and ‘social’ variable is as follows. 
The response to the ‘social’ variable is an adjustment to an observed reference level of the 
output variable. In other words, each individual observes the reference level (i.e. the level of 
the output variable for the social/reference group he/she identifies with) and adjusts his/her 
efforts accordingly so that the personal output variables moves together with the one for 
his/her reference group. For simplicity we further assume that there is a single reference 
group, although we show later that this assumption is not essential and can be relaxed. The 
social variable can thus be quantified as the corresponding (probably aspiration) level of the 
output variable, relevant for the individual.  
 
If the quantified social variable s increases, the individual output variable y will also 
increase, even if the economic incentive e does not change. This is because the individual 
views himself as being put into a social role. He tries to meet his perceived obligations (i.e. s). 
We do not go into possible psychological explanations for such behaviour.  
 
It is also reasonable to assume that when s increases, the corresponding increase in y 
is smaller. In simple terms this means that the individual has already approached his capability 
limit and increases in his aspiration level cannot be fully translated into actual increases in the 
output variable (utility). For the purposes of our model this means that the partial derivative of 
f with regard to the social variable is less than one.  We also assume a positive impact of the 
economic incentive. Hence: 
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Subject to the assumption of a single reference group, the social variable can be 
defined as: 
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The process of changes in the output variable, we have informally described above, 
can be formally expressed as a system of differential equations as below: 
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In (4), the dot over s represents the time derivative, while 0>µ  is the speed of 
adjustment. The question is whether model (4) has a stable equilibrium solution. It is however 
virtually identical to the mathematical representation analysed in Schlicht (1981) and we may 
directly use his proofs of existence and uniqueness, and omit this technical discussion. 
Furthermore the impact of the economic incentive e on the output variable (using that the 
output variable in equilibrium coincides with the aspiration level) can be calculated as: 
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One may interpret as coefficients of ‘social interaction’. It is straightforward to 
ascertain that they are close to 1/n when the social interdependence is weak (because then  
is close to zero for all i).  With strong social interdependence (i.e. when all  are close to 
one)  will tend to infinity. 
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Moreover note that  is strictly increasing if  increases for any j. This means that 
any increase in the importance of the social dimension will bring about an enhancement in the 
effect of the ‘economic’ variable. This enhancement may be viewed as a ‘social multiplier’ in 
that the social interaction enhances the ‘pure’ effect of the economic incentive. This ‘social 
multiplier’ can be calculated as:   
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Since 
n
ai
1>  for all i, then obviously s>1. 
 
Equation (7) expresses the direct increase in the output variable, given a unitary 
‘direct’ change due to the pure economic incentive. The other important observation relates to 
the speed of adjustment. Note that if all  are equal to one, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian of 
the system of differential equations (4) will be zero, implying that the speed of adjustment in 
all directions is zero. This means that strong social interdependence implies a rather slow 
speed of adjustment, while weak social interdependence increases the speed of adjustment. 
i
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3. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
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We have presented a simple stylised model combining social and economic factors. 
The two main points of interest are the enhancing effect of the social interaction on economic 
incentives and the simultaneous slowing down of the speed of adjustment.  These are more 
easily obtained in a simpler model assuming a homogeneous population of individuals. The 
model is readily generalisable in many directions without affecting the results. The nature of 
the model is represented by the social interaction quantifiers . Instead of a single reference 
group, a more general structure consisting of many reference groups may be imposed and the 
results still hold, although their formal description becomes much more complicated.  
i
sf
Different reference groups simply mean several different aspiration level subsets.  
Setting up different subsets is however equivalent to keeping the same set and alternatively 
adjusting the interaction quantifiers . The latter adjustment would mean adding to the 
model a set of ‘reference group’ multipliers, which modify the effect of the interaction 
quantifiers  (i.e. replacing  by  where  is the ratio of the corresponding 
aspiration level within the group and the average aspiration level across groups). Since 
production may be organized in various ways and each mode of organization will induce a 
characteristic pattern of interaction on the economic and social actors (Bowles, 1998), further 
refinements to the simple model may be necessary to reflect a specific problem area. The 
current model is nevertheless sufficiently general in its present form, since in many empirical 
applications we are typically only interested in a specific reference group (e.g. subsistence 
farmers) and it does not involve restrictive assumptions about the specific way of production 
organisation. 
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The ‘social multiplier’ effect and the reduction in the speed of adjustment obviously 
act in different directions. Taking an orthodox economic view, which assumes instantaneous 
adjustment, one is left with the enhancement of social factor on the impact of the economic 
incentive. Such a view should therefore conclude that social interaction is favourable. One 
may see the inconsistency of such a view since it is in principle grounded on the premises of 
impersonal interaction. When the possibility of an adjustment process extended over time is 
allowed, however, the effects are more complex. Note that since  gives a measure of the 
speed of adjustment in the direction of the ith individual, looking at the structure of the 
interaction quantifiers gives a good idea about the rates of change within the population. For 
illustration let us assume there are two clusters, a ‘social’ one with  close to one, and an 
‘economic’ one with  close to zero. The social cluster will adjust very slowly. The 
economic one will adjust much quicker. In addition it will benefit from the ‘social multiplier’, 
created due to the social cluster. This will of course create greater heterogeneity and 
inequality. The social cluster figuratively speaking subsidises the economic one in this 
example. The greater response of the economic cluster drives the total group forward. Such an 
effect can however be short-lived, because in the longer term the slow speed of adjustment of 
the social cluster may drag down the average aspiration level and negatively impact on the 
overall output variable. The overall effect of the social interaction is thus an outcome of the 
balance between ‘social’ and ‘economic’ behaviour. 
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Let us present an example. Subsistence farming has sometimes been explained as a 
consequence of extreme risk aversion by poor resource-deficient farmers (Kostov and 
Lingard, 2004). The effect of the economic factor for such farmers is large. The consequences 
of fluctuations in the economic factors may be serious even disastrous (hunger, famine, 
survival). The answer is to increase  and thus reduce the speed of adjustment. In this way 
they become, to some extent, insulated against the more serious consequences of unfavourable 
economic effects.  
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 4
The model presented is based on intrinsically unobservable, but economically 
meaningful variables. Let us continue our previous example and consider what an average 
applied economist will infer from subsistence farming data. After choosing some measurable 
output variable he/she will statistically estimate the impact of different economic variables 
and conclude that subsistence farmers are irresponsive to the postulated economic factors.  
What is he/she actually measuring? 
 
One cannot directly estimate .  If we assume that the social interaction variables 
are fixed (and can be approximated in the estimation process) the estimate will be 
contaminated by the effect of the ‘social multiplier’ and more importantly the speed of 
adjustment. Irresponsiveness to the economic factors may thus simply mean a very slow pace 
of adjustment. The estimate will typically be based on an instantaneous adjustment 
assumption and therefore: 
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which is the product of the speed of adjustment µ  and the pure economic response 
, given (or conditioned on) the social impact . Abstracting from the latter conditioning, 
the econometrically estimated effects will compound the economic effect with the adjustment 
speed. To be able to distinguish these, one needs to have the equilibrium values, so that the 
speed of adjustment can be estimated separately. These will not be available in general and 
would require elaborating an explicit theoretical model.  
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Making the model useful and operational requires acknowledging that the social 
effects are also endogenous. So far we have treated them as given. Let us revisit subsistence 
farming. The ‘commercialisation’ policy recommendations based on the ‘given’ social 
multipliers, should recommend measures that reduce the social interaction, but to a lesser 
degree than the targeted increase in the speed of adjustment to the new equilibrium. Such 
changes may involve changes in the structure of the reference groups (e.g. mass migration to 
industrialised urban areas). Recognising the endogenous character of the social impacts on the 
other hand suggests using economic policies, such as restricting the ‘pure effect’ of the 
economic variable in order to restrict the importance of the ‘social’ behaviour and increase the 
speed of adjustment. This involves protectionist policies, reminiscent of developed countries’ 
agricultural policies. Note however that we have three variables: the ‘social’, the ‘economic’ 
and the speed of adjustment. For analytical purposes we need to ‘exogenise’ two of these.  As 
a result the nice inverse relationship between the strength of the economic incentive and the 
importance of the social behaviour, gets much more complicated in practice. It is thus possible 
that protectionist policies could have adverse effects. In a developed country such policies are 
much more likely to reduce the speed of adjustment, given the smaller scope for changes in 
social interaction. Similarly, the short-term effects of such a policy in a developing country 
may further reduce the speed of adjustment (assuming the social interaction patterns are 
relatively stable) although in a medium to longer term the latter should increase.  The effects 
would also depend on the choice of ‘output’ variable and type of country. If one looks at 
consumption, changes would be much more drastic in an LDC (many of which currently have 
very low consumption levels), while with regard to production, larger impacts could be 
expected in a higher income developing country or a country in transition (due to larger 
production potential). 
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